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AN AVOIDABLE CONUNDRUM: HOW AMERICAN
INDIAN LEGISLATION UNNECESSARILY FORCES
TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN CULTURAL PRESERVATION
AND WOMEN’S VINDICATION
Catherine M. Redlingshafer*
INTRODUCTION
Gender violence in American Indian1 communities is a serious, complex
issue due to a myriad of legal and cultural barriers.2 Today, rates of rape and
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science, Strategic Communications, and History, University of Denver, 2014. I
would like to thank Professor Christine Venter for her invaluable guidance and feedback,
as well as Patrick Thomas for his relentless words of encouragement.
1 For the purposes of this Article, “Indian” means any person who is a member of an
Indian tribe, as defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1603(13) (2012). This definition includes those
who:
(A), irrespective of whether he or she lives on or near a reservation, is a member
of a tribe, band, or other organized group of Indians, including those tribes,
bands, or groups terminated since 1940 and those recognized now or in the
future by the State in which they reside, or who is a descendant, in the first or
second degree, of any such member, or (B) is an Eskimo or Aleut or other Alaska
Native, or (C) is considered by the Secretary of the Interior to be an Indian for
any purpose, or (D) is determined to be an Indian under regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
25 U.S.C. § 1603(13) (footnote omitted).
2 This Note does not address the societal and cultural hurdles American Indians face
such as: the geographic isolation of reservations, the lack of access to adequate medical
care (including rape kits), and the overall prevalence of alcoholism, poverty, and depression in Indian country. For a discussion on these issues, see RONET BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 84–86 (2008), http://www.nij.gov/topics/tribal-justice/vawresearch/pages/welcome.aspx; Bonnie Duran et al., Intimate Partner Violence and Alcohol,
Drug, and Mental Disorders Among American Indian Women from Southwest Tribes in Primary
Care, 16 J. NAT’L CTR. FOR AM. INDIAN & ALASKA NATIVE MENTAL HEALTH RES., no. 2, 2009,
393
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other sexual assaults are higher for American Indian women than any other
demographic in the country.3 In fact, a Department of Justice report found
that the assault rates for American Indian and Alaska Native women could be
as much as fifty percent higher than the next most victimized demographic.4
Significantly, a majority of these sexually motivated crimes are committed by
non-Indians—individuals who, for the most part, cannot be held accountable
in tribal courts,5 and who, all too often, are not held accountable in federal
courts.6
In the last 150 years, both caselaw and legislative action concerning criminal justice in American Indian communities have been inconsistent and
often discriminatory. Members of the federal government have even conceded that the history of the federal government’s dominance over American
Indian criminal justice systems is a “national disgrace.”7 Instead of protecting individual rights and supporting tribal autonomy, federal legislation has
effectively perpetuated crime in Indian country.8 Studies show that the federal government’s failure to hold perpetrators in Indian country accountable
at 11, 20; Joseph P. Gone & Carmela Alcántara, Identifying Effective Mental Health Interventions for American Indians and Alaska Natives: A Review of the Literature, 13 CULTURAL DIVERSITY
& ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 356 (2007), http://calmhsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/
09/Identifying-Effective-Mental-Health-Interventions-for-American-Indians-and-AlaskaNatives_A-Review-of-the-Literature.pdf; Timothy Williams, For Native American Women,
Scourge of Rape, Rare Justice, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/
23/us/native-americans-struggle-with-high-rate-of-rape.html?_r=0.
3 See BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 6, 33.
4 See FUTURES WITHOUT VIOLENCE, THE FACTS ON VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN
INDIAN/ALASKAN NATIVE WOMEN 1–2 (2011), http://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/
userfiles/file/Violence%20Against%20AI%20AN%20Women%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (citing STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992–2002 (2004)).
5 Tribal courts cannot prosecute non-Indians, except in rare circumstances. See infra
Part I.
6 See BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 89 (citing Amy Radon, Note, Tribal Jurisdiction
and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 1275, 1282 (2004)) (reporting how, between 2000 and 2001, federal authorities declined to prosecute 42.9% of assault cases); see also Timothy Williams, High Crime but
Fewer Charges on Indian Land, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
02/21/us/on-indian-reservations-higher-crime-and-fewer-prosecutions.html (“Federal
prosecutors in 2011 declined to file charges in 52 percent of cases involving the most serious crimes committed on Indian reservations, according to figures compiled by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University . . . .”).
7 See, e.g., Discussion Draft Legislation to Address Law and Order in Indian Country: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 1, 52 (2008) [hereinafter Discussion Draft
Legislation to Address Law and Order in Indian Country] (statement of W. Patrick Ragsdale,
Director, Office of Justice Servs., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior).
8 See id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs) (“[S]exual and domestic violence have reached epidemic proportions; victims
have to wait in many cases hours and weeks for a response to law enforcement calls . . . .
The lack of consequences has created some notion of lawlessness in many communities.”).
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actually emboldens offenders, specifically sexual offenders.9 In other words,
the federal government’s decision to prevent tribal courts from prosecuting
accused criminals encourages criminals to continue engaging in illegal activity on tribal lands. This lack of accountability has created a vicious cycle:
since no prosecutorial action is taken after a crime is reported,10 victims feel
discouraged from even reporting the crime in the first place.11
The federal government first stripped tribal courts of their criminal justice authority in the nineteenth century and has taken very small steps to
return minimal power to the tribes.12 The most recent attempts to give tribes
the authority to combat violence in their communities are represented in the
2010 Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) and the 2013 Reauthorization of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). TLOA has many facets, but, most
importantly, it authorizes tribal courts to impose enhanced sentences on
offenders.13 This necessary authorization, however, is shackled by strict
requirements.14 The 2013 VAWA reauthorization provided a much needed
expansion of tribal criminal jurisdiction, however, as with TLOA, many of the
provisions in the Act are only available to tribes that meet rigid qualifications15—qualifications that could impact the integrity, autonomy, and traditions of American Indian tribes.
VAWA’s tribal provisions were not implemented until March 2015; therefore, there is very little data available to measure their effectiveness. VAWA
did, however, initiate a one-year pilot project, commencing in February

9 See S. 1763, S. 872, and S. 1192: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th
Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of Thomas J. Perrelli, Assoc. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
10 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
11 See Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564,
1582 (2016) (“Studies show that countless Indian women and girls decline to even report
violent crime or sexual assault committed by non-Indians on the reservation because they
do not believe there will be justice.” (citing Lorelei Laird, Indian Tribes Are Retaking Jurisdiction Over Domestic Violence on Their Own Land, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.abajour
nal.com/magazine/article/indian_tribes_are_retaking_jurisdiction_over_domestic_violen
ce_on_their_own)); see also Williams, supra note 2 (“Women’s advocates on the [Navajo
Nation] reservation say only about 10 percent of sexual assaults are reported.”).
12 See infra Section I.B.
13 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234, 124 Stat. 2261,
2279 (2010) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)). As discussed in detail later, see infra
subsection I.B.6, this enhanced sentencing power is very limited in scope because TLOA
did not expand the tribes’ jurisdictional reach and enhanced sentences can only be
imposed against defendants whom either (1) previously have been convicted of the same
or a comparable offense, or (2) are under prosecution for a felony. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(b).
14 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b). In order to benefit from TLOA, tribes must make their laws
publicly available, the tribal courts must be courts of record, judges must be licensed to
practice law, and defense counsel must be afforded and must provide effective assistance.
Id.; see also subsection I.B.6.
15 See 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
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2014.16 Only three tribes qualified to participate in the project, and the data
on their experiences was recently released.17 This Note analyzes that data
and concludes that the three participating tribes were well suited to implement VAWA because of their preexisting legal infrastructures and overall
demographics. However, this Note argues that, because of its rigid requirements, VAWA will not impact most tribes as positively as it did the three pilot
tribes.
These laws, while an improvement and a necessity, make clear that “sovereignty comes at a price.”18 The federal government is effectively coercing
tribes to either implement a version of the federal criminal adjudication system (and give up their own, traditional tribal court system), or else deal with
the consequences of a system that cannot prosecute or punish many perpetrators. Moreover, even if the tribes decide to incorporate VAWA’s requirements in order to expand its jurisdiction, the limitations on TLOA’s
enhanced sentencing authority essentially makes the wider jurisdictional
grant toothless. In other words, even if a tribe is authorized to prosecute a
perpetrator, without the power to adequately sentence the individual, the
prosecution is futile.
This Note makes two arguments concerning the state of American
Indian legislation, and then proposes an alternative. First, this Note argues
that the recently enacted legislation regarding criminal justice in American
Indian societies will work to encourage cultural assimilation and result in the
loss of tribal traditions and autonomy. In effect, the legislation is putting
tribes in an impossible position: it is unfairly coercing them to choose
between (1) the preservation of their own culture and customs, and (2) the
ability to prosecute those victimizing their members. Second, this Note
argues that even if a tribe decides to risk its culture and tradition in order to
adopt the federal policies needed to protect its members, the legislation does
not go far enough. The two prominent legislative enactments in place—
TLOA and VAWA—are wrought with so many limitations and qualifications
that, in practice, they do not give tribes enough power to protect their
members.
Instead, this Note suggests that the federal system of appeals is capable
of solving the current dilemma. In reviewing tribal court decisions, federal
courts should give administrative agency–like deference to tribal courts
because the tribal courts are better positioned to interpret their own laws
(laws that are often rooted in tradition and culture), just as administrative
agencies are better positioned to interpret ambiguity in their respective

16 See NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
PILOT PROJECT REPORT 3 (2015) [hereinafter PILOT PROJECT REPORT], http://www.ncai.
org/attachments/NewsArticle_VutTUSYSfGPRpZQRYzWcuLekuVNeeTAOBBwGyvkWYw
PRUJOioqI_SDVCJ%20Pilot%20Project%20Report_6-7-16_Final.pdf.
17 See id. at 2.
18 Riley, supra note 11, at 1571.
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fields.19 By inquiring into whether the tribal courts acted reasonably, the
federal government can ensure that basic individual liberties are upheld in
tribal proceedings. Simultaneously, the tribal courts would interpret and
implement their own laws, thus preserving tribal autonomy.
Part I of this Note begins by discussing the historical context of gender
violence in American Indian communities. Then, it examines several significant pieces of federal legislation, as well as a notable Supreme Court case,
concerning crimes that occur on tribal lands or crimes involving American
Indian victims. Overall, the purpose of Part I is to show the evolution of
federal American Indian law in order to give context to the current state of
the law. Part II analyzes the pilot project data for the three VAWA pilot project-qualifying tribes: the Pascua Yaqui Tribe, the Tulalip Tribes, and the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservations. This Part particularly focuses on how each tribe’s court system had previously incorporated
VAWA’s procedural requirements20 and argues that, because of this preexisting legal infrastructure, these tribes were ideal (and unrepresentative) participants in the pilot project. Part III outlines why the legislation currently in
place is inadequate to combat gender violence in American Indian communities and argues that the restrictions in TLOA and VAWA should be relaxed.
Furthermore, this Part contends that the federal system of appeals could
smoothly solve the issue at hand by reviewing tribal court decisions with a
high level of deference. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the Note’s arguments and calls for (1) Congress to repeal the TLOA and VAWA limitations,
and (2) courts to implement a deferential standard of review in reviewing
tribal court decisions.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

AND

LEGISLATION

Implementation of federal law in Indian country has been described as
an “anomalous zone” because of the overall complexity and lack of consistency in both legislation and case law.21 After depriving tribal courts of
essentially all of their authority in the late nineteenth century,22 the federal
government slowly began returning some power to the tribes to enable them
19 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court
articulated the judicial deference standard that courts owe administrative agencies. 467
U.S. 837 (1984). According to the Court, if Congress has explicitly addressed an issue,
then the reviewing court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 843. But, if Congress has not commented on the matter, or the comment was
ambiguous, then the court should uphold the agency’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable. Id.
20 For example, each tribal court system already provided defense attorneys and
employed law-trained judges. See infra Part II.
21 Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1996) (defining
an “anomalous zone” as “a geographical area in which certain legal rules, otherwise
regarded as embodying fundamental policies of the larger legal system, are locally
suspended”).
22 See infra subsection I.B.1.
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to combat crime within their territory. Culminating in the passage of the
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 and the 2013 Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, federal legislation has come a long way. However,
as this Part points out, there is still a long way to go in order to give tribal
governments the power they need to address crime in their communities.
This Part has several goals. First, it briefly discusses the history of gender
violence in native communities, including its origins and inseparable link to
colonization. Then, it describes the major legislative acts and cases that laid
the foundation for the current legal framework concerning American Indian
criminal justice systems. Finally, the most recent legislative enactments are
examined, followed by an analysis of the current state of the law.
A. Colonization and Historical Trauma
Many scholars believe that gender violence in indigenous communities
stems from colonization.23 Until colonization, most tribes did not experience domestic violence.24 In fact, women “thriv[ed] under a unique form of
gender balance” where their opinions were considered in both “politics and
production.”25 But as colonial power intensified, native women were
deprived of their role in “spiritual, sexual, economic, social, political, diplomatic, and military realms.”26
Based on the oppression and domination of the native peoples, many
American Indian communities suffer from “historical trauma,” which is
“unresolved trauma and grief that continue to adversely affect the lives of
survivors of such trauma.”27 Examples of these adverse effects include inter23 See, e.g., ONT. FED’N OF INDIAN FRIENDSHIP CTRS., ABORIGINAL SEXUAL VIOLENCE
ACTION PLAN 2 (2011), http://www.ofifc.org/sites/default/files/docs/Aboriginal%20sex
ual%20violence%20action%20plan%20final%20report.pdf (“Sexual violence is rooted in
the legacy of residential schools, colonization and systemic discrimination that resulted in
the loss of culture, roles, family and community structure.”); ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST:
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE 137–39 (2005); Emily Snyder et al., Gender and Violence: Drawing on Indigenous Legal Resources, 48 U.B.C. L. REV. 593, 604 (2015)
(“Violence against women is . . . intimately linked with the broader colonial context . . . .”);
Hilary N. Weaver, The Colonial Context of Violence: Reflections on Violence in the Lives of Native
American Women, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1552, 1555–62 (2009).
24 See Weaver, supra note 23, at 1555.
25 Sam Grey, Self-Determination, Subordination, and Semantics: Rhetorical and Real-World
Conflicts Over the Human Rights of Indigenous Women, 47 U.B.C. L. REV. 495, 498–99 (2014).
26 Id. at 499 (first citing Penelope Andrews, Violence Against Aboriginal Women in Australia: Possibilities for Redress Within the International Human Rights Framework, 60 ALB. L. REV.
917 (1997); then citing Carl Fernández, Coming Full Circle: A Young Man’s Perspective on
Building Gender Equity in Aboriginal Communities, in STRONG WOMEN STORIES: NATIVE VISION
AND COMMUNITY SURVIVAL 242 (Kim Anderson & Bonita Lawrence eds., 2003); then citing
Kiera L. Ladner, Gendering Decolonisation, Decolonising Gender, 13 AUSTL. INDIGENOUS L. REV.
62 (2009); and then citing M. Céleste McKay, International Human Rights Standards and
Instruments Relevant to Indigenous Women, 26 CAN. WOMAN STUD. 147 (2008)).
27 Eduardo Duran et al., A Postcolonial Perspective on Domestic Violence in Indian Country,
in FAMILY VIOLENCE AND MEN OF COLOR: HEALING THE WOUNDED MALE SPIRIT 143, 148
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nalized oppression and the normalization of violence.28 Unfortunately, this
normalization of violence oftentimes manifests itself in gender violence.29
B. Federal Legislation and Case Law
Prior to colonization, individual tribes handled criminal adjudication
according to their own tribal customary law.30 “[C]onflict between Indians
and settlers [however,] slowly introduced federal jurisdiction into Indian
country criminal justice matters.”31 Given the unique position American
Indian tribes hold as both a sovereign and a dependent entity,32 the federal
government has a history of legislation specifically aimed at resolving jurisdictional disputes involving American Indians. Decades of inadequate legislative action resulted in a “jurisdictional maze,”33 where “criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country crimes is governed by shifting and sometimes contradictory variables, including where the crime was committed, whether both the
defendant and victim are Indians, and the classification of the alleged
crime.”34 Most scholars agree that the early enactments were not only unsuccessful, but also “actually caused reservation crime to flourish.”35 This Section outlines the relevant legislation and case law, placing particular
emphasis on their impact on gender violence.

(Ricardo Carrillo & Jerry Tello eds., 2d ed. 2008); see also Weaver, supra note 23, at
1555–62.
28 See FUTURES WITHOUT VIOLENCE, supra note 4, at 4; see also Donna Coker, Enhancing
Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 16 (1999)
(“The material, psychological and spiritual circumstances of Navajo people—circumstances that are a direct result of colonization—are related to both the occurrence of
domestic violence and women’s responses to such violence.”).
29 See Williams, supra note 6 (“[American Indian women] are raped or sexually
assaulted at a rate four times the national average, with more than one in three having
either been raped or experienced an attempted rape.”).
30 See Riley, supra note 11, at 1578 (“Long before the Constitution was drafted and
ratified, Indian nations had inherent sovereignty over their people and territories and governed according to their own laws.” (citing Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J.
1675, 1718–21 (2012))); see also K.N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE
WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
31 Riley, supra note 11, at 1577.
32 See generally Zachary S. Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and Territorial Criminal
Jurisdiction, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 657 (2013); see also BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 7.
33 Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 504 (1976) (referring to criminal justice as a “jurisdictional maze”).
34 Riley, supra note 11, at 1575 (footnote omitted).
35 Id. at 1574.
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1. The Major Crimes Act (1885)
In 1885, the federal government asserted jurisdiction over “major
crimes”36 in Indian country, even if between two American Indians, with the
passage of the Major Crimes Act.37 This legislation granted federal courts
jurisdiction over violent crimes against women, including aggravated assault,
rape, and homicide.38 While the Act did not entirely preclude tribal governments from prosecuting the offenders (prosecution was permitted as long as
both parties were American Indian), this legislation was still seen as a move
“to break up traditional tribal justice systems and further the assimilation of
Indians into White society.”39
2. Indian Reorganization Act (1934)
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)40 represents a rare example of the
federal government returning power to tribal governments. Under the IRA,
tribes are permitted to organize their own governments.41 This authority
includes the power of tribes to institute their own court systems.42 Once a
tribe decides to create a court system, a Court of Federal Regulation (“CFR
Court”)43 acts as a temporary court while the self-determined court is being
(re)established.44 Since the enactment of the IRA, hundreds of tribes have
established their own court systems and the utilization of CFR Courts has
36 Major crimes under the current U.S. Code include “murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, a felony assault under section 113, an
assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or
neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the
Indian country.” 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
37 The Major Crimes Act of 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012)). This was enacted in response to Ex parte Crow Dog, in which
the Supreme Court found a lack of jurisdiction to try an Indian accused of a crime against
another Indian on tribal land. 109 U.S. 556, 567 (1883).
38 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
39 Riley, supra note 11, at 1578.
40 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (1982).
41 See id. § 476.
42 See id.
43 According to Tribal Court Clearinghouse:
“Courts of Indian Offenses,” or “Courts of Federal Regulations” (“CFR Courts”)
were the first modern iteration of tribal courts. They were established by the
Department of the Interior in 1883 in part to handle less serious criminal actions
and resolve disputes among tribal members. However, many judges were nonIndian BIA superintendents with express objectives of assimilating Native people
into western society and abolishing “barbarous” practices such as ceremonial
dances. Some tribes still operate CFR Courts today . . . .
Tribal Courts, TRIBAL COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/justice.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
44 See id.
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consistently declined.45 Tribal governments continue to benefit from the
IRA; however, as Part III discusses, recent federal legislative enactments
threaten the IRA’s positive impact.
3. Public Law 280 (1953)
In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 280 (“PL-280”),46 which authorized
state governments to exert jurisdiction over offenses committed in Indian
country or involving American Indians and Alaska Natives.47 The six states
with the highest population of American Indians were required to adopt PL280,48 and “optional” states could choose to assume part or total jurisdictional authority over American Indian affairs within their states.49 This statute “was an attempt at compromise between wholly abandoning the Indians
to the states and maintaining them as federally protected wards, subject only
to federal or tribal jurisdiction.”50 Of the over 500 tribes in the continental
United States, fifty-two percent are located in PL-280 states.51 Therefore, in
practice, this extra level of jurisdiction further complicates the already convoluted criminal justice system.
4. Indian Civil Rights Act (1968)
Supporters of the Indian Civil Rights Act claimed that it would guarantee individual rights to American Indians,52 but it in fact resulted in major
45 See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV.
225, 233 n.23 (1994) (discussing how, since 1978, the number of tribal courts has
increased while, simultaneously, the number of CFR courts has decreased); see also STEVEN
W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF TRIBAL JUSTICE AGENCIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY,
2002 iii (2005), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctjaic02.pdf (recognizing how the
number of tribal courts continues to rise with about 188 in 2002).
46 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.).
47 See FUTURES WITHOUT VIOLENCE, supra note 4.
48 Mandatory states include Alaska (upon statehood), California, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. See ch. 505, 67 Stat. at 588.
49 States that elected to assume jurisdictional authority over American Indians include
Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and
Washington. See BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 75 n.26.
50 Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation
Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 537 (1975).
51 See Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First
Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697 (2006) (analyzing findings regarding the
impact of Public Law 280).
52 See Riley, supra note 11, at 1580 (“Congress’ goal was to balance individual rights
with the federal policy of tribal self-determination.” (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 62 n.11 (1978))). Individual protections guaranteed by this Act include the
writ of habeas corpus, id., but do not include the requirement of grand jury indictment or
jury trials. See Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Hearing on S. Res. 53 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 1 (1961).
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limitations on the power of tribal governments to sentence offenders.53 The
statute has been strengthened over the years, but the sentencing powers
awarded to tribal courts are still inadequate. When it was first enacted, tribal
courts were not permitted to punish offenders with more than $500 in fines,
six months in jail, or both.54 This provision was amended in 1986 to allow
punishments of up to a $5000 fine, one year in jail, or both.55 It was again
amended in 2010 and now allows for punishments of up to three years in
jail.56 Many critics believe that this Act “represents a congressional decision
to limit Native American sovereignty” and is “inadequate to protect the rights
of Native American individuals[,]” especially Native American women.57
5. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978)
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,58 the Supreme Court issued a significant, far-reaching opinion regarding tribal court jurisdiction. According
to the Court, tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over non-American Indians, even if the offense occurred on tribal territory.
The Oliphant decision was highly criticized by many scholars who argue
that the Oliphant holding in conjunction with the other legal constraints in
place at the time resulted in widespread injustice.59 According to American
Indian scholar Angela Riley, the combination resulted in “countless incidences of inadequate punishments, failures to prosecute, paltry resources for
safety and policing, as well as brazen acts of violence by savvy criminals
actively seeking to commit crimes on reservations where they believe[d] they
[were] insulated from prosecution.”60 Many scholars agree with Riley’s suggestion that not only was the state of the law at the time ineffective in prosecuting perpetrators, but also that it effectively made non-American Indian
offenders immune from prosecution.61 Studies representing the low report53 See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 73, 77–78
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)).
54 See id.
55 See id. This grant of authority did not include the power to impose felony
sentences. See id.
56 Partially amended by the Tribal Law and Order Act, discussed infra subsection I.B.6.
57 See e.g., Carla Christofferson, Note, Tribal Courts’ Failure to Protect Native American
Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 169–170 (1991).
58 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
59 See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. 433, 458 (2005) (describing Oliphant as “troubling”); Joseph William Singer,
Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641,
650 (2003) (arguing that the Oliphant decision was an attack on tribal sovereignty).
60 Riley, supra note 11, at 1582.
61 See id. at 1587 (noting how “every crime—even misdemeanors—committed by nonIndians against Indians or Indian property in Indian country can only be prosecuted by the
federal government,” and later acknowledging how federal prosecutors fail to prosecute a
majority of crimes reported on Indian country); see also 160 CONG. REC. S942 (daily ed.
Feb. 12, 2014) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (discussing the Violence Against Women Act,
Kimberly Norris Guerrero, native Cherokee and Colville Indian stated, “[o]ver the years,
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ing and response levels for crimes committed in Indian country, specifically
for sexual abuse cases, further indicate the ineffectiveness of the legislation
and Oliphant decision.62
6. Tribal Law and Order Act (2010)
Tribal courts’ inability to prosecute non-Indians became increasingly
problematic as a larger number of non-Indians started living in Indian country.63 Advocates and lobbyists fighting for American Indian’s and women’s
rights spent decades calling for a change.64 Eventually, two key enactments
emerged: the 2010 Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA)65 and the 2013
Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).66
TLOA’s stated purpose is to combat crime in tribal communities while
placing a strong emphasis on decreasing violence against American Indian
and Alaska Native women.67 The Act, among other things, provides for
enhanced sentencing, requires reporting of federal declination rates, and
creates the Indian Law and Order Commission (ILOC).68 While TLOA does
not attempt to expand criminal jurisdiction of tribal governments, it does
“allow tribes enhanced sentencing over those defendants in cases in which
the tribe would already have criminal jurisdiction.”69 Under TLOA, qualifying tribes are authorized to impose punishments of up to three years in jail
and fines up to $15,000.70 While the enhanced sentencing power provision,
what happened is that white men, non-native men, would go onto a Native American reservation and go hunting—rape, abuse, and even murder a native woman, and there’s absolutely nothing anyone could do to them”); Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of
Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 128 (2004) (arguing that Oliphant puts “tribal communities at the mercy of non-Indian criminals”).
62 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
63 In 1990, forty-five percent of people living in Indian country had an American
Indian householder. See EDNA L. PAISANO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, WE THE FIRST
AMERICANS 1, 11 (1993). By 2010, however, seventy-seven percent of people living in
Indian country identified as non-Indian. See Riley, supra note 11, at 1583 (citing TINA
NORRIS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2010 at 13–14 (2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br10.pdf).
64 Riley, supra note 11, at 1584 (discussing the hearings begun in 2004 by the U.S.
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, a series of articles the Denver Post published on criminal injustice in Indian country, and a 2007 Amnesty International report explaining the
jurisdictional barriers faced by Indian tribes).
65 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, 124 Stat. 2261
(codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
66 See 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012).
67 See Tribal Law and Order Act One Year Later: Have We Improved Public Safety and Justice
Throughout Indian Country?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 1
(2011) (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs).
68 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(b), 2809(a), 2812(a).
69 Riley, supra note 11, at 1585.
70 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302. This provision also amended the Indian Civil Rights Act, discussed above. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text.
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which is arguably the most important provision of TLOA, is a great step
toward improving criminal justice in Indian country, its implementation is
shackled by several limitations.
For example, tribes must qualify in order to impose these heightened
sentences.71 In order to qualify, the tribe must implement proceedings that
align more comfortably with the federal system—a requirement that could
result in a complete reorganization of a tribe’s system of adjudication. The
tribe must make its laws publicly available,72 the tribal courts must be courts
of record,73 judges must be licensed to practice law,74 and defense counsel
must be afforded and must provide effective assistance.75 While these
requirements may seem reasonable, they can be difficult for tribes to meet
given the structure of their established systems.
TLOA goes even further to limit tribal communities’ sentencing
enhancement power by placing restrictions on who the enhanced sentence
can be imposed against. In order to seek a heightened sentence, the defendant must either (1) previously have been convicted of the same or a comparable offense, or (2) be under prosecution for a felony.76 Therefore, firsttime sexual offenders (or convicts that have committed crimes other than
sexual assault), regardless of the severity of the offense, cannot be sentenced
for more than one year by the tribal courts, as the Indian Civil Rights Act
would govern.77
The next critical feature of TLOA, its collection and disclosure requirement for information regarding prosecution rates,78 “was meant to increase
political accountability and transparency between tribes and the federal government.”79 This provision is extremely necessary given the astoundingly
high declination rates of sexual assaults reported in Indian country.80 Since
the federal government is (typically) the only body with jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against an Indian in an Indian community, it is extremely important that it investigates and prosecutes these
crimes.
TLOA also established the Indian Law and Order Commission.81 The
ILOC was tasked with analyzing the criminal justice system relating to Indian
71 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c).
72 Id. § 1302(c)(4).
73 Id. § 1302(c)(5).
74 Id. § 1302(c)(3)(b).
75 Id. § 1302(c)(1).
76 Id. § 1302(b).
77 See supra subsection I.B.4.
78 See Tribal Law & Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 212(a)–(b), 124 Stat.
2261, 2267–68 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2809(a) (2015)) (describing Congress’s requirement that the Attorney General submit an annual report detailing the declination rates in
Indian country).
79 Riley, supra note 11, at 1587.
80 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
81 See 25 U.S.C. § 2812(a).
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country as a whole.82 The ILOC synthesized its findings in A Roadmap for
Making Native America Safer, in which it found that tribally led solutions would
be the most effective way to end the criminal injustice in Indian country.83
Additionally, the Act created initiatives to confront some of the practical
and social challenges that contribute to the gender violence problem. These
include the Tribal Access Program (TAP),84 the American Indian and Alaska
Native Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner-Sexual Assault Response Team (SANESART),85 and a collaborative initiative with the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Service Administration (SAMHSA).86
7. The Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (2013)
The Violence Against Women Act is a comprehensive piece of legislation
that criminalizes interstate violence against women.87 In response to the
inadequate state of the law at the time, Congress reauthorized VAWA in 2013
in order to address, among other things, three major legal constraints that
impaired tribal jurisdiction.88 First, it gave qualifying tribes the authorization
to exercise “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” (SDVCJ) over
those who commit acts of domestic violence,89 regardless of their Indian or
82 Id. § 2812(d).
83 INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER 27
(2013), https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native_A
merica_Safer-Full.pdf.
84 TAP launched in August 2015 “to provide tribes access to national crime information systems for both civil and criminal purposes. TAP allows tribes to more effectively
serve and protect their nation’s citizens by ensuring the exchange of critical data across the
Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) systems and other national crime information
systems.” Tribal Access Program (TAP), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/tribal
/tribal-access-program-tap (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
85 SANE-SART aims to provide “support to enhance the capacity of [American Indian
and Alaska Native] communities to provide coordinated community, victim-centered sexual assault responses to adult and child victims.” OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES, AMERICAN
INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE SEXUAL ASSAULT NURSE EXAMINER-SEXUAL ASSAULT RESPONSE
TEAM INITIATIVE SUMMARY 1 (2012), http://www.ovc.gov/AIANSane-Sart/pdf/AI-AN_
SANE-SARTInitiativeSummary.pdf.
86 Under TLOA, the SAMHSA is tasked with determining “the scope of the alcohol
and substance misuse problems faced by American Indians and Alaska Natives” and identifying areas the federal government can improve on. About the TLOA, SAMHSA, http://
www.samhsa.gov/tloa/about (last updated June 27, 2016).
87 Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386, 114 Stat. 1491 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
88 See 160 CONG. REC. S940–43 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2014) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
89 PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 16, at 5. Crimes that are not covered by this
jurisdictional grant include: crimes committed outside of Indian country; crimes between
two non-Native Americans; crimes between two strangers, including sexual assault; crimes
committed by a person who lacks sufficient ties to the tribe, such as living or working on its
reservation; and child abuse or elder abuse crimes. See Lauren R. Kelly, The Human Rights
Impacts of VAWA 2013: A True Victory for Native American Women?, 7 INQUIRIES J., no. 5, 2015,
at 4–5.
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non-Indian status (amending the Major Crimes Act and effectively overruling
part of Oliphant).90 This apparent grant of authority, however, did not come
without strings attached. Significantly, the jurisdiction only extends to qualifying tribes. In order to be eligible for the SDVCJ, a tribe must meet the
same requirements set forth under TLOA’s sentencing enhancement
power.91 Moreover, the tribe can only exercise this grant of jurisdiction
under very specific circumstances when the offender “[l]acks ties to the
Indian tribe”;92 therefore the tribal courts still have no authority to prosecute
offenders who are strangers to the victims. Given these restraints, only three
tribes were initially authorized to participate in VAWA’s pilot project.93
C. Current Jurisdictional Status
In order to receive the full benefits of TLOA and VAWA (such as the
enhanced sentencing authority and SDVCJ), tribal communities are forced
to abide by requirements that would not otherwise bind them.94 These
requirements fundamentally conflict with many of the tribes’ established justice systems.95 Moreover, even if the tribe is willing to conform to the federal
system, they still would not have the power to prosecute any individual who
did not have sufficient ties with the community.96 This is especially troubling
considering the fact that, “[a]bout 9 in 10 American Indian victims of rape or
sexual assault were estimated to have had assailants who were [nonIndian].”97 Furthermore, even if jurisdiction is appropriate, tribal courts
cannot impose sentences over one year if the offender has not previously
90

See supra Section I.B. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIAN COUNTRY INVESTIGAAND PROSECUTIONS 17–18 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/tribal/tribal-law-andorder-act.
91 See supra subsection I.B.6.
92 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (2012). In order to have sufficient ties, the defendant
must: reside in the Indian country of the participating tribe; be employed in Indian country of the participating tribe; or be a current or former spouse, intimate partner, or dating
partner of a member of the participating tribe or an Indian who resides in the Indian
country of the participating tribe. Id.
93 The three authorized tribes were: (1) the Pascua Yaqui Tribe (Arizona); (2) the
Confederate Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation (Oregon); and (3) the Tulalip
Tribes (Washington). See PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 16, at 5. Additionally, just one
day before the pilot project concluded, the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes (Montana) and the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate Tribe (South Dakota) also qualified. Id. However,
given the timing, neither tribe was able to initiate prosecutions under VAWA. See Riley,
supra note 11, at 1591 n.136 (citing PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 16, at 5). The pilot
project is discussed in detail in Part II.
94 See supra notes 65–95 and accompanying text; see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376,
385 (1896) (holding that the United State Constitution is not applicable to tribal
governments).
95 See Riley, supra note 11, at 1595–607 (discussing the balance between tribal sovereignty and assimilation).
96 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
97 LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 7 tbl.10 (1999).
TIONS
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been convicted of the same or a similar offense or if they are not concurrently being tried for a felony. All things considered, this “grant of authority”
leaves a lot to be desired.
II. THE VAWA PILOT PROJECT UNPACKED
Although VAWA did not take effect until March 2015, its reauthorization
created a “Pilot Project”98 that “enabled Indian tribes who received prior
approval from the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) to exercise
SDVCJ on an accelerated basis.”99 The Department of Justice established a
protocol for tribes to apply to the pilot project,100 and only three tribes were
initially approved to participate101: the Pascua Yaqui Tribe in Arizona, the
Tulalip Tribes in Washington, and the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservations in Oregon.102 Each tribe applied to the project with a
preexisting criminal justice system that resembled the federal system.103
During the pilot project, the participating tribes heard a total of twentyseven SDVCJ cases.104 “Of the 27 cases, 11 were ultimately dismissed for
jurisdictional or investigative reasons, 10 resulted in guilty pleas, 5 were
referred for federal prosecution and 1 offender was acquitted by a jury.”105
While every tribal conviction of a sexual offender is a victory, the fact that
eleven cases were dismissed for “jurisdictional or investigative reasons” and
another five were referred for federal prosecution—meaning that the tribal
courts did not effectively have jurisdiction over sixteen cases, more than fifty
percent—is evidence that current legislation does not give tribal courts
enough authority.
This Part analyzes the success of VAWA, and specifically the SDVCJ, in
each of the three tribes that were approved before the pilot project commenced. Section II.A focuses on the Pascua Yaqui Tribe, Section II.B then
examines the Tulalip Tribes’ experience, and Section II.C considers the cases
dealt with in the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation.
Given the characteristics of each tribe, specifically the fact that each tribe’s
preexisting court system closely resembled the federal system, this Part
argues that the results of the pilot project are not representative of how
98 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 908(b),
127 Stat. 54, 125–26.
99 PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 16, at 2. The pilot project began on February 20,
2014 and lasted until March 7, 2015, the date of general implementation. See id. at 5.
100 See id. at 4. As part of the application, the tribes were required to fill out an Application Questionnaire. The questionnaires largely consisted of questions regarding whether
the tribe was willing to implement VAWA’s requirements. To review the completed questionnaires, see Tribal Implementation of VAWA, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, http://
www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/pilot-project-itwg/pilot-project (last visited Oct. 10, 2017).
101 As previously mentioned, two additional tribes were approved as the pilot project
was wrapping up. See supra note 93.
102 See PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 16.
103 See generally id.
104 See id. at 5.
105 Id.
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VAWA will perform in the majority of tribes. Each of the participating tribes
was “already well-positioned to implement the new laws,” and any “concerns
they had regarding assimilation may have already been dealt with in earlier
iterations of criminal justice decisions and discussions.”106 Without having to
make these tough decisions regarding cultural assimilation and the autonomy of the tribe, the VAWA SDVCJ went rather smoothly. The real test will
come, however, when tribes with rich cultural traditions that include criminal
justice systems inconsistent or incompatible with the federal system are
forced to choose between (1) assimilating and (2) enacting measures that
will enable them to hold sexual offenders accountable. Therefore, as Part III
argues, the legislation’s restrictions should be repealed.
A. Pascua Yaqui Tribe
Pascua Yaqui Tribe leadership described the Tribe as the “ideal” participant for the pilot project, given its location and demographics.107 The Tribe
is located near Tucson, Arizona, and has approximately 19,000 members—
4000 or 5000 of whom live on the reservation.108 The reservation’s population is composed of approximately ninety percent American Indians.109 Single-mother households account for forty-three percent of all Pascua Yaqui
households, making it the most common household demographic.110
Compared to most American Indian tribes, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe is
somewhat unique in that, prior to its participation in the pilot project, its
court system already aligned relatively nicely with the federal court system.111
Significantly, therefore, the Tribe was not tasked with a restructuring of its
system of adjudication before engaging in the pilot project, which is one reason why the Tribe was such an ideal candidate. For example, the Tribe has
provided for defense attorneys and has employed traditionally trained judges
for many years—automatically fulfilling two of VAWA’s requirements for
SDVCJ.112 The link between the Tribe’s justice system and the federal justice
system is also represented by the fact that several of its prosecutors are designated as Special Assistant United States Attorneys (SAUSAs).113 The Tribe
106
107

Riley, supra note 11, at 1606.
PETER YUCUPICIO ET AL., NAT’L CONG. INDIAN AM., PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE VAWA IMPLEMENTATION 1, 2, http://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/pilot-project-itwg/Pascua_Yaqui_VAWA_
Pilot_Project_Summary_2015.pdf. This report was compiled by Peter Yucupicio, the Tribal
Chairman; Fred Urbina, the Attorney General of the tribe; and Oscar Flores, the Interim
Chief Prosecutor of the tribe. Id. at 9.
108 See id. at 2; PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.
109 See PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.
110 See YUCUPICIO ET AL., supra note 107, at 2.
111 See id. at 3 (“The Pascua Yaqui tribal court provides all defendants with the same
rights in tribal court as they would have in any state or municipal court.”).
112 See PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.
113 See id. Special Assistant United States Attorneys are “appointed for the purpose of
assisting in the preparation and presentation of special cases” pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 543
(2012). U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL 3-2.300 (1997), https://www.jus
tice.gov/usam/usam-3-2000-united-states-attorneys-ausas-special-assistants-and-agac. Addi-
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even conceded that it elected to participate in the pilot project “in part
because it had already built the necessary infrastructure required by federal
prerequisites.”114
The Tribe regarded the pilot project and the implementation of VAWA
(and SDVCJ) as a success.115 Over the course of the thirteen months, the
Pascua Yaqui Tribe had eighteen SDVCJ cases—the highest number of the
three tribes.116 The eighteen cases involved fifteen separate defendants,117
all of whom were (necessarily) non-Indian American.118 Notably, the fifteen
defendants “had more than 80 documented tribal police contacts, arrests, or
reports attributed to them” on the reservation in the previous four years
alone.119
VAWA’s SDVCJ was, fortunately, exceptionally successful in the Pascua
Yaqui Tribe.120 The key word here being exceptionally. This success should
not be manipulated into an argument that VAWA will always be so successful,
for several reasons. First, leaders of the Pascua Yaqui Tribe noted that VAWA
“is consistent with Yaqui tradition and culture.”121 Therefore, the Tribe was
not forced to weigh its cultural tradition against its desire to protect members
of the community. The Tribe had seemingly already weighed these values, or
the values did not conflict in the first place. Furthermore, the Pascua Yaqui
Tribe already had most of the legal mechanisms in place to combat its
domestic violence issues.122 All it needed was authority—the authority to try
non-Indians and the authority to impose enhanced sentences. In this regard,
the pilot project demonstrated “how necessary Tribal jurisdiction is over nonIndian perpetrators of domestic violence.”123 It did not demonstrate, however, that VAWA was the appropriate way to grant this authority.
Significantly, while the Pascua Yaqui Tribe leaders were satisfied with the
results of the pilot project, they admitted that their preexisting legal infrastructure was a major factor in the project’s ultimate success.124 The tribal
leaders noted how VAWA “may not be appropriate for all tribes” and that
“[t]ribes with a smaller homogenous population or without the necessary
tionally, “[t]he tribe currently employs twenty-six uniformed patrol officers who are certified by Arizona as state officers and most are federal Special Law Enforcement
Commissioned officers.” YUCUPICIO ET AL., supra note 107, at 3.
114 YUCUPICIO ET AL., supra note 107, at 3.
115 Id. at 2 (“The impact over the last year has been substantial both on protecting the
immediate tribal victims of domestic violence and the children who witnessed the
violence.”).
116 See PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.
117 Id.
118 The purpose of the “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” grant is to prosecute non-Indians. See supra subsection I.B.7.
119 See PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.
120 See generally id.
121 YUCUPICIO ET AL., supra note 107, at 4.
122 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
123 YUCUPICIO ET AL., supra note 107, at 3.
124 Id. at 5.
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resources to build the required infrastructure may find that the cost and
complexity of VAWA [is] prohibitive.”125 Herein lies the problem. VAWA
cannot necessarily be as smoothly implemented in tribes where the culture
and legal tools do not so neatly align with those of the federal system. But
the tribes where this would be the case nevertheless deserve the same level of
protection.
B. Tulalip Tribes
The Tulalip Tribes are located in western Washington State and have
around 4500 members—2500 of which live on the reservation.126 Similarly
to the Pascua Yaqui Tribe, around ten percent to fifteen percent of the reservation’s population is non-Indian.127 The Tribes’ criminal justice system, like
the Pascua Yaqui Tribe’s system, is similar to the federal system. For example, all of VAWA’s qualifications for granting enhanced sentencing authority—employing law-trained judges, providing indigent defense, permitting
non-Indians to participate in the jury pool, and recording court proceedings128—were incorporated into the Tulalip Tribes’ criminal adjudication
system over ten years ago.129
The pilot project was successful in the Tulalip Tribes, although not as
successful as it was in the Pascua Yaqui Tribe.130 The Tulalip Tribes prosecuted six SDVCJ cases, four of which resulted in guilty pleas. Notably, the six
“non-Indian defendants had over 88 documented tribal police contacts,
arrests, or reports attributed to them in the past.”131 A jurisdictional grant
and enhanced sentencing authority was undeniably necessary. However, it
was not enough. Each of the four guilty defendants were only placed on
probation and were required to attend batterer intervention
programming.132
Similarly, to the Pascua Yaqui Tribe’s experience, the Tulalip Tribes had
success implementing VAWA and, specifically, SDVCJ. However, also similar
to the Pascua Yaqui Tribe, the Tulalip Tribes’ criminal justice system already
fit the VAWA mold, making it much easier to implement. Additionally, while
the four tribally-prosecuted, guilty sexual offender pleas represent progress,
there is still room for improvement in terms of jurisdictional reach and sentencing power.

125 Id.
126 See PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 16, at 9.
127 Riley, supra note 11, at 1604.
128 PILOT PROJECT REPORT, supra note 16, at 9.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 10.
131 Id.
132 See id.
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C. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservations
The Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservations (CTUIR)
are located in Oregon.133 Unlike the Pascua Yaqui and Tulalip Tribes, the
CTUIR has a very high population of non-Indians living on the reservation.
Of the approximately 3280 people, forty-six percent are non-Indians.134 The
CTUIR is similar to the other two tribes, however, in terms of its criminal
justice system: the CTUIR’s system greatly resembles to the federal system.135
The CTUIR has, for example, “provided indigent counsel, recorded tribal
judicial proceedings, employed law-trained judges, and included non-Indians
on tribal juries since long before VAWA 2013 was enacted.”136
According to the Tribes, sixty percent of the cases brought before the
Umatilla Family Violence Program in 2011 involved non-Indians.137 Therefore, the authority to prosecute these non-Indian individuals was clearly necessary. Fortunately, VAWA seemed to be effective in the CTUIR. The CTUIR
prosecuted four SDVCJ cases during the pilot project, all of which resulted in
guilty pleas.138 The convicts were sentenced to tribal probation, including a
requirement to participate in batterer intervention treatment.139
Significantly, the CTUIR had implemented TLOA in 2011,140 and therefore was authorized to impose enhanced sentences.141 However, the Tribes
did not seek enhanced sentences in any of their SDVCJ cases during the pilot
project.142 The lack of information available on the cases makes it impossible to determine why an enhanced sentence was not sought, but TLOA’s
limitations could be a factor. As previously discussed, in order to impose
more severe sentences under TLOA, the tribe not only needs to comply with
procedural requirements,143 but the accused must either (1) already have
been convicted of the same or a comparable offense, or (2) be under prosecution for a felony.144 Therefore, it is possible (and perhaps likely) that
these limitations prohibited the tribal courts from imposing harsher
sentences. The CTUIR’s experience demonstrates how TLOA can limit
VAWA, hindering a tribe’s authority to protect its members.
133 Id. at 11.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See supra subsection I.B.6.
142 Riley, supra note 11, at 1616.
143 See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text (discussing how the tribe must make
its laws publicly available, the courts must be courts of record, judges must be licensed to
practice law, and defense counsel must be afforded and provide effective assistance).
144 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL109.txt

412

unknown

Seq: 20

notre dame law review

*

*

9-NOV-17

13:56

[vol. 93:1

*

These cases illustrate how VAWA can be successful—as long as the tribe
has a preexisting criminal justice system that mirrors the federal system. The three
participants applied to participate in the project “in part because they already
had in place many of the procedural mechanisms required under the statute.”145 This legal structure made the VAWA implementation deceivingly
simple because any cultural concerns about assimilation and loss of autonomy were practically nonexistent.146 The smooth transitions represented in
these cases are exceptions. Under other circumstances, tribes could effectively have to choose between revamping their entire criminal justice system—and simultaneously compromising their cultural traditions—and
protecting victims of gender and domestic violence. This is a choice that no
tribe should have to make.
III. THE WRONG “SOLUTION”
Every government must have mechanisms in place aimed at protecting
its citizens. These mechanisms necessarily must include the authority to
arrest, prosecute, and punish wrongdoers. The federal government has
never permitted American Indian governments to function in this way.147
Instead, the federal government has limited tribal governments’ exercise of
authority to the point of perpetuating crime on reservations.148 TLOA and
VAWA have taken important steps toward authorizing tribal governments to
exercise more power, however, the federal government conditioned this necessary grant of power on the adoption of procedural practices that are contrary to traditional tribal governments.149 It is well-established that
“[a]cknowledging the cultural viewpoint of the indigenous nations is requisite for creating law appropriate for the Indians directly affected.”150 These
enactments, however, fail to do so.
This Part argues that TLOA and VAWA will effectively coerce tribal governments into adopting the acts’ procedural requirements for the sake of the
enhanced sentencing power and expanded jurisdictional reach. The tribes
are therefore forced into an impossible position: uphold tribal traditions or
protect their members from violence. The federal government, through
145 Riley, supra note 11, at 1606 (citing Press Release, Francesca Hillery, Tulalip Tribes,
Tulalip Tribes One of Three Tribes Nationwide to Implement Special Domestic Violence
Criminal Jurisdiction Under VAWA 2013 (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.tulaliptribes-nsn.gov/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=OHGIBp5ufqo%3D&tabid=36.
146 See YUCUPICIO ET AL., supra note 107, at 4 (noting how Pascua Yaqui tribal leaders
found VAWA “consistent with Yaqui tradition and culture”); Riley, supra note 11, at 1606
(discussing why the three tribes were “well-positioned” to participate in the pilot project).
147 See generally Part I.
148 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
149 See supra subsections I.B.6–7.
150 Valencia-Weber, supra note 45, at 229.
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these pieces of legislation, is imposing constitutional limitations on tribal
courts—limitations that would not normally apply.151
In order to preclude tribes from making this unmanageable decision,
this Part argues that the limitations restricting the implementation of the
current legislation should be relaxed. By loosening the legislative restrictions, tribes will be able to stay autonomous and deal with gender violence
issues in a way that will best fit their individual needs. In short, Section III.A
argues that the limitations placed on the grant of authority are coercive and,
ultimately, unnecessary. Congress should repeal these limitations and allow
tribes the flexibility to entertain their own adjudication methods in order to
adequately confront the issues in their communities.
Some argue that TLOA and VAWA restrictions are necessary to protect
the individual liberties of nonmembers.152 This Part argues that the federal
appeals system is sufficient to quell any concerns that non-Indians’ constitutional rights may be violated in tribal court proceedings. As long as federal
courts give tribal courts a high degree of deference, then both tribal autonomy and the individual rights of non-Indians will be adequately preserved.
A. Autonomy of Tribal Courts
“The traditional law and narrative of many tribes . . . place emphasis on
community, cooperation, and relatedness. However, the dominant legal narrative of majoritarian jurisprudence is often rooted in individualism, competition, and autonomy.”153 Given this contrast, federal legislation addressing
tribal governance should consider the customs and culture of the tribes when
contemplating binding legislation. No such factors were considered in the
years leading up to the passage of TLOA and VAWA. Rather, under the cur151 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (discussing how, since tribal courts are not
created by the Constitution, it does not apply).
152 See 142 CONG. REC. E1704 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996) (statement of Rep. Henry J.
Hyde) (“I want to say emphatically that it is only right that [tribal] courts should provide
all of the constitutional protections required by law, including basic due process. The
consistent enforcement of constitutional norms is particularly important if the tribal courts
are to have jurisdiction over nonmembers who have only tangential relationships with the
tribes.”); Molly Ball, Why Would Anyone Oppose the Violence Against Women Act?, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/why-would-any
one-oppose-the-violence-against-women-act/273103/ (discussing how senators may have
voted against VAWA because tribal courts do not provide adequate protection for defendants). Contra Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2280, 2306 (1989). It should also be noted that procedural individual rights in tribal
courts have existed for decades. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT: A REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 1, 11–12 &
nn.36–43 (1991) (cataloguing tribal court opinions pertaining to the right to a trial by jury,
to a fair and speedy trial, to the right to counsel, to reasonable search and seizure, to
adequate jail conditions, to due process in the administration of justice, and to freedom
from fines).
153 Frank Pommersheim, A Path Near the Clearing: An Essay on Constitutional Adjudication
in Tribal Courts, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 405 (1991).
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rent system, the federal government expects tribes to either (1) forgo tradition, or (2) accept the reality that non-Indians will not be held liable for their
criminal acts in Indian country.
Many tribes have established methods of imposing criminal justice that
vary greatly from the traditional federal system. For example, “[o]n many
reservations, Indian tribal courts use methods such as ‘Peacemaking,’ ‘Sentencing Circles,’ or other methods of dispute resolution that more closely
resemble the ways disputes were settled among Native people before the nonIndian society stepped in.”154 The Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, for
example, utilize Sentencing Circles for many juvenile cases.155 Moreover,
the Navajo and Seneca Nations have established Peacemaker Courts, which
typically rule on disputes involving “cultural beliefs and a failure to comply
with custom.”156 Likewise, some tribes may simply resolve disputes through
discussions with families, clans, talking circles, or elder councils.157
While a majority of tribes do not follow these traditional models, their
court systems still significantly vary from the federal system. For example,
many tribes appoint (or elect) individuals who are “knowledgeable of the
customs and traditions of a particular tribe” as judges, regardless of whether
they have a formal law degree.158 These arbitrators are better positioned to
understand the tribes’ values and customs.159
As opposed to the federal system, these tribal models of criminal justice
focus on restitution, not punishment.160 The federal government should
consider these fundamental differences in their legal systems when enacting
binding legislation. TLOA and VAWA failed to do so and, instead, are forcing tribal courts to conform to the federal system. Pressuring tribes to
change their tribal system, even if the tribal system already incorporates some
aspects of the federal system, directly impacts tribal sovereignty because “tribally operated courts are the vanguard for advancing and protecting the

154 B.J. JONES, ROLE OF INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2000), http://
www.icctc.org/Tribal%20Courts.pdf (footnotes omitted).
155 See id. at 6 n.17.
156 Valencia-Weber, supra note 45, at 251. The Seneca Nation in New York provides an
interesting example, as New York state law requires that state courts enforce the Peacemaker Court judgments on three reservations: Allegheny, Cattaraugus, and Tonawanda.
See id. at 252 n.83 (citing N.Y. INDIAN LAW art. 4 § 46 (1950)).
157 See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal
Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 309 (1998) (describing Winnebago dispute resolution
through “family, clan or council” deliberations (quoting Rave v. Reynolds, 23 Indian L.
Rep. 6150, 6158 (Winnebago Sup. Ct. 1996))).
158 JONES, supra note 154, at 7; see also id. at 12 (“Indian tribes traditionally resolved
disputes by consensus rather than by court adjudication.”).
159 See Valencia-Weber, supra note 45, at 227–30, 250–55.
160 See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, LAW AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF PREINDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 12–17 (1983) (categorizing law systems into punishment or restitution models).
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right of tribal self-government.”161 The legislation, therefore, should not
have imposed so many limitations on the grant of power.
B. Federal Appeals: A Simple Solution
Instead of threatening tribal cultures by conditioning tribal governments’ criminal adjudication power on the adoption of procedural functions,
the federal government should rely on the federal appeals system to ensure
individual rights are being protected in tribal proceedings.162 This Section
argues that federal courts should review tribal decisions in a manner similar
to review of administrative agency decisions—with great deference. This
level of deference is necessary to respect tribal autonomy. At the same time,
federal court review of final tribal decisions will ensure that individual rights
are being protected.
The relationship between administrative agencies and the federal government and tribal governments and the federal government is fundamentally different.163 However, the rationale for granting administrative
agencies such a high degree of deference is applicable to tribal courts. In
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme
Court determined that administrative agencies tasked with administering specific statutes have the authority to resolve ambiguities regarding interpretations of that statute.164 According to the Court, since these agencies had
“great expertise” in the relevant field and judges were “not experts in the
field,” courts should defer to agency decisions, as long as these decisions are
reasonable.165 The Court performed a two-step inquiry into whether or not
an administrative agency deserved this high-degree level of deference. First,
if the reviewing court concludes that Congress had explicitly addressed an
issue, then the court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.”166 But, if Congress did not comment on the matter, or was
ambiguous, then the court should uphold the agency’s interpretation as long
as it is reasonable.167
161 Valencia-Weber, supra note 45, at 232; see also Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual
Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts and the Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18 N.M. L. REV. 49, 71 (1988) (describing tribal courts as “the primary tribal
institutions charged with carrying the flame of sovereignty and self-government”).
162 See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (holding that after exhausting
tribal remedies, litigants who met the diversity jurisdiction requirement could appeal to
the federal court).
163 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal Courts’ Jurisdictional Determinations:
Towards Co-Existence, Understanding, and Respect Between Different Cultural and Judicial Norms,
24 N.M. L. REV. 191, 193 (1994) (asserting that administrative agencies and tribal courts
are essentially opposites in terms of how they fit into the overall government structure, but,
nonetheless, advocating for administrative agency-like deference to be applied to tribal
proceedings).
164 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
165 Id. at 865.
166 Id. at 842–43.
167 Id. at 843.
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There are 562 federally recognized Indian Nations in the United
States.168 Each tribe has its own unique values, customs, culture, and, most
pertinently, law. Given the diverse cultures, it would be impossible for federal courts to either promulgate rules applicable to all tribes or to try and
review de novo decisions rooted in any of the hundreds of unique laws and
customs.169 The federal judges would be completely incapable of determining and applying a particular tribe’s relevant laws and customs—just as federal judges are incapable of deciding what constitutes a “ ‘new or modified
major stationary source[ ]’ of air pollution.”170 Therefore, deferring to the
experts—the tribal courts and the administrative agencies—is the most logical solution.
Again, it is important to acknowledge how tribal governments and
administrative agencies hold very different positions in our overall system of
government. Nonetheless, the deference given to administrative agencies
acts as an appropriate framework for the deference that should be granted to
tribal courts. The first inquiry, whether or not Congress has legislatively
addressed the matter, is a bit trickier in the context of tribal governments
because the Constitution does not apply to American Indian tribes,171 and,
thus, certain constitutional rights (such as court procedural rights) are not
required in tribal proceedings. However, as discussed in Part II, Congress
has passed a number of laws trying to coerce tribes into guaranteeing these
rights. If these statutes are relaxed, as this Note argues they should be, then
the reviewing court could easily go on to step two of the analysis: whether or
not the tribal court acted reasonably.172
Under this deferential standard of review, federal courts would still be
able to protect against any egregious violations of individual rights that took
place as a result of tribal prosecution by considering whether or not the tribal
courts acted reasonably. Any completely incoherent holdings or arbitrary
procedural happenings could be reversed and remanded. Simultaneously,
tribal courts’ sovereignty would be protected because the tribal courts are the
bodies interpreting and implementing their own laws.
CONCLUSION
Gender violence in American Indian communities is astoundingly prevalent. There are many reasons for the pervasiveness of such abuse, such as the
historical context of colonization, certain common societal behaviors, poor
declination rates, and a lack of reporting (due to a lack of confidence in the
justice system). The most significant factor, however, is the federal govern168 NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN NATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 2 (2015), http://www.ncai.org/about-tribes/indians_101.pdf.
169 See Skibine, supra note 163, at 210.
170 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840 (quoting Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7502(b)(6) (1982)).
171 See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 385 (1896) (holding that the United States Constitution is not applicable to tribal governments).
172 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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ment’s legislative failure to grant trial courts any jurisdictional reach or sentencing authority. This legislative failure, scholars agree, effectively promotes
crime in Indian country because non-American Indian offenders are rarely
held accountable.
Admittedly, the federal government has come a long way since the Major
Crimes Act of 1885. The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 and the Violence
Against Women Reauthorization of 2013 were very significant, necessary
steps toward giving tribal governments the power to combat crime, specifically sexual offenses, in Indian country. However, these pieces of legislation
are inadequate given the serious and widespread issues tribal governments
face.
First, TLOA and VAWA are wrought with limitations and thus do not
give tribal governments enough authority to have the power to protect their
members. Under current law, tribal courts remain unable to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians who do not have “sufficient ties” to the tribe. Additionally, tribes cannot seek a heightened sentence for an accused offender
unless that offender has either previously been tried for the same or a similar
offense, or is under prosecution in federal court. Given the historical context of criminal justice in Indian country (tribes did not have jurisdiction to
try non-Indians) and the fact that, generally, federal courts have failed to
charge or try a large number of offenders accused on Indian country, this
“grant of authority” is more of a façade. In other words, since many sexual
offenders were not tried in the past due to the loopholes in the system (for
example, the tribe did not have jurisdiction or the federal court failed to
prosecute), it is likely that they will again slip through the cracks, either
because they were never previously tried or because the federal courts refrain
from prosecution.
Current legislation is also inadequate because of the harsh conditions it
puts on exercising the increased authority. To ask a tribal government to
restructure its criminal justice system so that it aligns with the federal system
is to ask the tribe to choose between attaining the authority to combat crime
within its territory and its traditions, customs, and autonomy. This is simply
asking too much.
Tribes should be able to implement the TLOA and VAWA grants of
authority more easily, so they are not forced to sacrifice their culture for the
safety of their people. Even though some tribal courts already incorporate
procedures similar to those used in the federal courts, any mandatory change
would interfere with a tribe’s sovereignty and undermine the Indian Reorganization Act. By relaxing the TLOA and VAWA restrictions, tribes would
be able to keep their tribal customs in place while still protecting their
members.
Furthermore, the federal government need not worry about tribal courts
infringing on non-Indian constitutional protections because all litigants can
appeal to federal court, after exhausting all tribal recourse. By utilizing a
very deferential standard of review, federal courts would be able to protect
individuals against any possible unfair treatment by tribal courts while still
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not interfering with tribal sovereignty. This relationship between tribal
courts and federal courts, along with the TLOA and VAWA grants of authority (stripped of their restrictions), would give tribal governments the power
they need to protect their members.

